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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES M. LUNNEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, and the 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
CAREER ; 
THE ] 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Case No. 93-0737 CA 
i 5 CSRB 46 (Step 6) 
| 11 CSRB/H.O. 154 (Step 5) 
1 Priority 14. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE CAREER 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, CASE NUMBER 11 CSRB/H.O. 154 (Step 5), 5 
CSRB 46 (Step 6). 
I. 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended) confers 
1 
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court or other appellate Courts, as 
provided by statute, to review all final agency actions resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1953, as amended) and Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure grant jurisdiction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals to review the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of State agencies. This appeal 
is from a formal adjudicative proceeding conducted by the Career 
Service Review Board (herein CSRB), a statutorily created and 
state funded administrative agency. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the CSRB err in shifting the burden of proof from 
the Utah Department of Transportation (herein UDOT) to 
Petitioner? 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of interpreting the CSRB's 
enabling statutes and rules and is to be analyzed on the 
intermediate standard with the CSRB's ruling to be assessed for 
its reasonableness and rationality. Kent v. Dept. of Employment 
Sec.. 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Ut. App. 1993). 
2. Did the Step 5 Hearing Officer have authority to, sua 
sponte, re-open the evidentiary record after the same had been 
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closed? 
Standard of Review; This issue is one of interpreting the CSRB's 
enabling statutes and rules and is to be analyzed on the 
intermediate standard with the CSRB's ruling to be assessed for 
its reasonableness and rationality. Id.. 
3. Did the CSRB err in determining there was substantial 
evidence in the record to support the disciplinary sanctions 
imposed by UDOT? 
Standard of Review; This issue is one of interpreting the CSRB's 
enabling statutes and rules and is to be analyzed on the 
intermediate standard with the CSRB's ruling to be assessed for 
its reasonableness and rationality. Id.. 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the case 
on appeal and each of the following are set forth verbatim in the 
Addendum hereto (pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure); 
a. Utah Code Annotated 63-2-101 (1953, as amended). 
b. Utah Code Annotated 63-2-304(8) (1953, as amended). 
c. Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended). 
d. Utah Code Annotated 67-18-1 (1953, as amended). 
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-2(6) (1953, as amended). 
-15(2)(a) (1953, as amended). 
-15(2)(b) (1953, as amended). 
-18(1) (1953, as amended). 
a-406(2)(a) (1953, as amended). 
R137-1-20C. 
R137-1-20E. 
R137-1-20G. 
R137-1-20J. 
R137-1-20L. 
R477-11-1. 
R477-ll-l(l)(a-e). 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. CASE NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION 
This case arises from a grievance proceeding resulting from 
disciplinary proceedings initiated by UDOT against Petitioner 
Lunnen (herein Lunnen). On August 10, 1992, UDOT's Executive 
Director imposed a two grade demotion (from Grade 19 to Grade 17) 
upon Lunnen and reduced Lunnen's pay by 2,75%. Lunnen timely 
appealed this disciplinary measure to the Step 5 level of the 
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grievance and appeal procedure for State career service 
employees. 
On November 10, 1992, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held 
before a duly appointed hearing officer, Michael N. Martinez. 
The parties stipulated to a substantial number of facts and 
thereafter each of the parties presented testimony and exhibits. 
The record was then closed. On January 5, 1993, Mr. Martinez 
issued an Interim Order With Continuing Jurisdiction in which he 
determined that Lunnen was insubordinate but that UDOT had not 
carried its burden of proving that a demotion was a consistent 
discipline for one act of insubordination. Mr. Martinez, sua 
sponte, re-opened the record for the purpose of receiving 
additional documentation from UDOT. 
On or about January 13, 1993, Lunnen's grievance 
representative filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting 
UDOT's case be dismissed for failure to carry its burden of 
proof. On January 25, 1993, UDOT submitted a pleading entitled 
"Response to Order" in which UDOT supplied other instances of 
discipline it believed to be pertinent to the case. On February 
3, 1993, Lunnen's grievance representative filed a reply to 
UDOT's "Response" in which he asserted UDOT's evidence was 
inadmissible under the residuum rule and the Hearing Officer 
erred in re-opening the record. 
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On March 15, 1993, Mr. Martinez issued his Final Order, in 
which he ratified UDOT's demotion of Lunnen and denied Lunnen's 
Motion for Reconsideration. Lunnen appealed to the CSRB. 
The CSRB heard oral argument on August 12, 1993, and issued 
its Decision and Final Agency Action on October 27, 1993. The 
CSRB affirmed UDOTfs demotion, but on grounds different than Mr. 
Martinez. The CSRB determined there was substantial evidence in 
the record before Mr. Martinez' re-opening thereof, such that the 
demotion was appropriate. The CSRB also determined Lunnen, not 
UDOT, had the burden of proving inconsistent application of 
disciplinary sanctions which, in effect, over-ruled Mr. Martinez. 
Lastly, the CSRB ruled Mr. Martinez had authority to re-open the 
record. 
Lunnen appeals to this Court from the decisions of the Step 
5 Hearing Officer and the CSRB. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All citations are to the Findings of Fact (F.F.) rendered by 
the Hearing Officer. Copies of those Decisions are set forth in 
the Addendum. 
Petitioner James M. Lunnen (herein Lunnen) has been employed 
with the Utah Department of Transportation (herein UDOT) since 
1978. F.F. 1. Lunnen was first promoted to a Grade 17, Highway 
Operations Specialist in 1985. F.F. 2. Subsequently, he was 
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promoted to a Grade 19, Highway Operations Specialist, in 1989. 
F.F. 3. As a Highway Operations Specialist, Lunnen is subject to 
being on 24 hour call-out for emergencies. F.F. 4. On June 12f 
1992f Lunnen failed to respond to a call-out and was demoted 
because of his failure to respond. F.F. 28. But for the call-
out difficulties, Lunnen was a satisfactory employee and, in 
fact, received an overall successful performance evaluation for 
the period during which he was insubordinate. F.F. 29. See, 
also, Joint Exhibit 3. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I; The Utah State Personnel Management Act and State 
Personnel Management rules are legal limitations on the 
discretion state agencies have to discipline employees. State 
Personnel rules require disciplinary sanctions to be applied in a 
consistent manner to all career service employees. The 
Legislature has placed the burden of proof in all disciplinary 
cases upon the state agency. When read together, the State 
Personnel rules and the statutory burden of proof place the 
burden of proving "consistent application" on state agencies. 
The CSRB erred in holding this burden was on Lunnen and the Court 
should place the burden of consistent application on UDOT. 
Several reasons suggest this conclusion. First, placing the 
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burden on the agency is consistent with State Personnel rules and 
the statutory burden of proof. Second, the CSRB administrative 
rules require a Hearing Officer to determine if the penalty is 
excessive, to include whether it is consistent. Third, the 
concepts of fairness and due process embodied in the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act (herein USPMA) and Division of Human 
Resource Management rules are consistent with placing the burden 
on the agency. And finally, employees are prohibited from 
obtaining documents to meet the burden by Government Records 
Access and Management Act. The burden is less onerous on the 
agency and should therefore be placed upon it. 
POINT II: The CSRB has only that authority granted to it by 
statute. When the CSRB exceeds its own administrative rules, it 
abuses its discretion. The CSRB's rules mandate the closing of 
the record at the end of the evidentiary hearing. In light of a 
Hearing Officer determining that the CSRB has no authority to re-
open the record and UDOT's counsel's implicit agreement with 
Lunnen's position, the CSRB erred in granting the Hearing Officer 
discretion to re-open the record. 
POINT III; The CSRB made its determination of substantial 
evidence regarding the disciplinary sanction on evidence that the 
Hearing Officer did not find substantial or credible. The CSRB 
also ignored Lunnen's successful performance evaluations covering 
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the time period in which he was demoted. The CSRB further 
ignored the argument of UDOT's representative that he believed 
demotion was appropriate because of the insubordination issue -
not performance. The CSRB's reliance on performance issues and 
non-credible testimony does not constitute substantial evidence 
to support the disciplinary sanction. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UDOT HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT LUNNEN'S 
DEMOTION WAS A DISCIPLINARY SANCTION 
CONSISTENT WITH OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED 
EMPLOYEES. 
Lunnen is a long-term career service employee of UDOT, 
having been employed there since 1978. As a career service 
employee, Lunnen is classified as a schedule B employee under the 
Utah State Personnel Management Act (herein the USPMA). See, 
U.C.A. 67-19-15(2)(b)(1953, as amended). Schedule B employees, 
unlike schedule A exempt employees, can only be disciplined to 
"advance the good of the public interest" and "for just cause." 
Compare U.C.A. 67-19-15-(2)(a)(1953, as amended) (schedule A 
employees serve "at the pleasure of the appointing officers 
without regard to tenure") with U.C.A. 67-19-18(1)(1953, as 
amended) (career service employees can only dismissed or demoted 
for just cause). 
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Further, this Court has previously recognized that Section 
18 of the USPMA imposes legal limitations on the discretion an 
agency has to demote career service employees. See, Kent v. 
Dent, of Employment Sec, 860 P.2d 984, 987 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Kent decision also recognizes that the administrative rules 
promulgated by the Executive Director of the Department of Human 
Resource Management (i.e., State Personnel — herein DHRM) 
constitute additional legal limitations on the discretion state 
agencies may exercise in disciplining career service employees. 
Finally, the Legislature has statutorily imposed upon state 
agencies the burden of proof in all cases involving discipline of 
career service employees: 
"The agency has the burden of proof in all 
grievances resulting from dismissals, 
demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, 
reductions in force, and disputes concerning 
abandonment of position." U.C.A. 67-19a-
406(2)(a) (Emphasis supplied). 
In light of the foregoing statutory mandates, Lunnen 
maintains that UDOT cannot demote him if UDOT violated the USPMA. 
Nor can UDOT demote Lunnen if it violated DHRM rules. Lastly, 
Lunnen asserts that UDOT cannot demote him if it failed to carry 
its statutory burden of proof. Importantly, the case at bar 
involves a demotion and is the first case this Court has had on a 
disciplinary issue that did not involve termination from 
employment. 
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In order to assess the case before the Courtf Lunnen asserts 
the Court must first examine the elements of a disciplinary 
action brought by a state agency against a career service 
employee. DHRM Rule 477-11-1 specifies that career service 
employees may be disciplined for willful misconductf to include 
insubordination. Rule 477-11-1(1) also mandates the factors that 
shall be considered by an agency when determining the type and 
severity of the discipline to be imposed, to-wit: 
"The type and severity of any disciplinary 
action taken shall be governed by principles 
of due process which include; 
(a) Consistent application 
(b) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(c) Determination of fact 
(d) Timely notice of noncompliance 
(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as 
defined herein." R477-ll-l(1), Utah Admin. 
Code (1993) (Emphasis supplied). 
Based on R477-ll-l(l) and UDOT's statutory burden of proof 
requirement set forth in U.C.A. 67-19a-406(2)(a) hereinabove, 
Lunnen contends that UDOT had the burden of proving two (2) 
elements in order to have properly exercised its discretion: 
1) misconduct on the part of the employee; 
and, 
2) the disciplinary sanction shall be 
consistent with other discipline imposed for 
like misconduct. 
In this case, Lunnen concedes that UDOT has carried its 
burden of proving misconduct. Lunnen believes, however, that 
UDOT wholly failed to prove the second element of its case — 
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namely, that UDOT has demoted other career service employees for 
similar misconduct. An examination of the Step 5 Hearing 
Officer's (herein the Hearing Officer) decisions and the CSRB's 
analysis is therefore appropriate. 
The Hearing Officer's initial determination was styled 
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order with 
Continuing Jurisdiction" (herein the Hearing Officer's Interim 
Order — a copy is set forth in the Addendum). In the Hearing 
Officer's Interim Order, he acknowledged that UDOT had not 
carried it burden of proof: 
"Pursuant to U.C.A. 67-19a-406, the Agency 
has the burden of proof in cases of demotion. 
The Agency has not provided any proof that 
the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with 
prior discipline for one action of 
insubordination...." Hearing Officer's 
Interim Order at page 8. 
After receipt of the Hearing Officer's Interim Order, 
Lunnen's representative filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
asserting UDOT had failed to carry its burden of proof and no 
discipline should be imposed. In a subsequent decision styled 
"Final Order and Decision to Step 5 Proceedings" (herein Final 
Step 5 Decision — a copy is set forth in the Addendum), the 
Hearing Officer again acknowledged that UDOT had not carried its 
burden of proof but asserted (incorrectly we believe) that 
further evidence on the issue of disciplinary sanctions was 
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necessary: 
"Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion for 
Reconsideration that the Agency did not prove 
a demotion was consistent discipline for one 
act of insubordination. That is true. 
However, this does not invalidate the finding 
that Lunnen was, without doubt and by 
substantial proof, insubordinate and the only 
evidence received was that the reduction in 
grade was what the Agency thought was just 
and consistent with prior discipline. 
Therefore, it was for Lunnen's benefit that 
further proof of consistency was 
required...." Step 5 Final Decision at page 
3. 
Significantly, the Hearing Officer, as finder of fact, was 
never persuaded by the meager evidence presented by UDOT at the 
evidentiary hearing. To the contrary, the Hearing Officer 
determined the glib testimony of Gene Sturzenegger did not meet 
UDOT's burden of proof as shown in the preceding quotation. In 
fact, the Hearing Officer's assessment of Mr. Sturzenegger's 
testimony as reflecting the Agency's "thoughts" was a 
determination that his testimony was neither compelling testimony 
nor substantial evidence. The Hearing Officer simply did not 
believe Mr. Sturzenegger's testimony was of sufficient precision 
or persuasion to warrant reliance thereon as substantial 
evidence. Despite determining that UDOT had not carried its 
burden of proof, the Hearing Officer did not dismiss UDOT's case 
but sought additional evidence from UDOT after the record had 
been closed. Based on the additional evidence, the Hearing 
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Officer affirmed the demotion. The appropriateness of the 
Hearing Officer's sua sponte re-opening of the record is 
discussed at Point II hereinbelow. 
Lunnen thereafter appealed to the CSRB and asserted, as one 
of his grounds on appeal, that the Hearing Officer had erred by 
not dismissing UDOT's case against Lunnen after determining UDOT 
had failed to meet its burden of proof. The CSRB, sub silentio, 
overruled the Hearing Officer's analysis regarding the burden of 
proof and determined that Lunnen had the burden of proving UDOT's 
disciplinary sanction was a consistent application of 
disciplinary policies: 
"The Department had the burden of proof when 
the Step 5 proceedings commenced (67-19a-
406(2)(a)). UDOT had the initial burden to 
show that its discipline was supported by 
just cause. Once the agency has shown that 
its disciplinary sanction was reasonable and 
correct in relation to the facts and 
circumstances, then the burden is on the 
employee to show that the penalty imposed was 
disproportionate or otherwise constituted an 
abuse of discretion (R137-1-20C.2.). 
Certainly inconsistency of treatment between 
similarly situated employees could be a 
showing of disproportion, which could 
constitute an abuse of discretion. An abuse 
of discretion results when a sanction is so 
unreasonable that it offends reasonable 
minds." Final Agency Decision at page 15. 
The CSRB's analysis cannot stand for several reasons. 
First, the Kent decision clearly mandates that the provisions of 
R477-ll-l(l) constitute a limitation on the discretion of UDOT to 
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demote career service employees. One of the mandatory 
limitations in R477-ll-l(l) is "consistent application" of 
discipline. Further, R477-ll-l(l) is not only a mandatory factor 
to be considered in disciplinary cases but is also a factor 
grounded in constitutional concepts of "due process." The CSRB's 
analysis thus completely ignores the constitutional obligation 
imposed upon UDOT by R477-ll-l(l) to consistently apply 
discipline to all of its career service employees. 
Second, the CSRB's analysis ignores the procedure it has 
adopted, by administrative rule, in deciding disciplinary cases. 
Specifically, R137-1-20C specifies a two (2)-pronged inquiry — 
1) whether the facts support the allegations of misconduct and 2) 
whether the Agency's disciplinary sanction is excessive or 
disproportionate, to-wit: 
"(1). The CSRB hearing officer shall first 
make factual findings based solely on the 
evidence presented at the hearing without 
deference to any prior factual findings of 
the agency. The CSRB hearing officer shall 
then determine whether: (a) the factual 
findings made from the evidentiary/Step 5 
hearing support with substantial evidence the 
allegations made by the agency or the 
appointing authority, and (b) the agency has 
correctly applied relevant policies, rules, 
and statutes. 
(2). When the CSRB hearing officer 
determines in accordance with the procedures 
set forth above that the evidentiary/Step 5 
factual findings support the allegations of 
the agency or the appointing authority, then 
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the CSRB hearing officer must determine 
whether the agency's decision, including any 
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. In making this latter 
determinationf the CSRB hearing officer shall 
give deference to the decision of the agency 
or the appointing authority unless the 
agency's penalty is determined to be 
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an 
abuse of discretion in which instance the 
CSRB hearing officer shall determine the 
appropriate remedy." (Emphasis supplied). 
Significantly, the CSRB's Step 6 Final Decision acknowledges 
that inconsistent application of disciplinary sanctions would 
violate its rules as found in R137-1-20C because an inconsistent 
discipline would constitute an abuse of discretion. See, Step 6 
Final Decision at page 15. Thus, while the CSRB admits that 
inconsistent discipline would violate DHRM rules and its own 
rules, the CSRB persisted in its position that Lunnen had the 
burden of proof on the issue of consistency, despite the Hearing 
Officer being required (by CSRB rule) to affirmatively make a 
determination on the issue of consistency. Such an analysis is 
illogical and should not be adopted by this Court. 
Third, by overruling the CSRB and imposing the burden of 
proving consistent application on UDOT, this Court would be 
acting in a manner that confoanns with the USPMA and due process 
principles. The USPMA reflects the public policy of this state 
that career service employees should receive "fair treatment." 
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U.C.A. 67-19-2(6)(1953, as amended). Further, the "consistent 
application" factor found in R477-ll-l(l) is predicated on due 
process principles inasmuch as the rule specifically designates 
the factors as being predicated on due process. Simply stated, 
UDOT has the burden to use due process when taking disciplinary 
action against tenured employees. Seef Cleveland Bd. of 
Education v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985). Shifting the 
burden of proof to Lunnen is therefore inconsistent with the due 
process principles adopted by DHRM in R477-ll-l(1). 
Fourth, the burden of proving "consistent application" is 
not an onerous burden to impose on a state agency. State 
agencies maintain personnel files on all state employee, see 
U.C.A. 67-18-1 (1953, as amended), and can readily access 
information to prove that it acted consistently and fairly in any 
given case. In contrast, the Government Records Access and 
Management Act, U.C.A. 63-2-101,et.seq.(1953, as amended), 
specifically prohibits employees from obtaining records of other 
employees who have been disciplined: 
"63-2-304 Protected records. 
The following records are protected if 
properly classified by a governmental 
entity:... 
(8) records created or maintained for civil, 
criminal, or administrative enforcement 
purposes or audit purposes, or for 
discipline, licensing, certification, or 
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registration purposes, if release of the 
records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to 
interfere with investigations undertaken for 
enforcementf discipline, licensing, 
certification/ or registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to 
interfere with auditsf disciplinary. or 
enforcement proceedings; ..." U.C.A. 63-2-
304(8) (1953f as amended). 
The CSRB's ruling thus has the effect of forever preventing 
a career service employee from proving an agency acted in an 
inconsistent manner because the employee will not be able to 
obtain the records necessary to carry that burden. The CSRBrs 
analysis therefore places a burden on the career service employee 
that he/she can never carry. The CSRB's analysis is neither 
reasonable nor rational because it requires career service 
employees to do that which it is impossible for them to do. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should overrule the 
CSRB and hold that UDOT had the burden of proving consistent 
application in imposing disciplinary actions. This Court should 
further hold that when an agency fails to meet its necessary 
burden of proof, it is therefore precluded from imposing 
disciplinary measures in that case. 
II. 
THE HEARING OFFICER EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY 
BYf SUA SPONTE, RE-OPENING THE RECORD. 
Administrative agencies have only that authority that is 
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expressly or impliedly granted by statute. Nielsen v. Div. of 
P.O.S.T.. 851 P.2d 1201 (Ut. App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
This court has previously reversed the CSRB on occasions where 
the CSRB exceeded the authority it possessed by its own 
administrative rules. See, Utah Department of Corrections v. 
Despain. 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1991); Utah Department of 
Corrections v. Sucher, 796 P.2d 721 (Utah App. 1990). 
The CSRB had adopted a procedure for closing the record in 
evidentiary hearings: 
"Closing of the Record. After all testimony, 
documentary evidence, and arguments have been 
presented, the hearing officer shall close 
the record and terminate the proceeding, 
unless one or both parties agree to submit a 
posthearing brief within a specified time." 
R137-1-20E. (Emphasis supplied). 
The CSRB has further specified that rehearings are not 
permitted, R137-1-20L, and that only the evidentiary record will 
be considered by the CSRB at subsequent appellate hearings. See 
R137-1-21E. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer is required by CSRB 
rule to issue a written decision after closing of the record: 
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. 
Following the closing of the record, the 
hearing officer shall make and enter a 
written decision containing findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The decision and 
order is filed with the administrator and 
without further action becomes the decision 
and order of the evidentiary hearing." R137-
1-20G. 
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Additionally, a Step 5 Hearing Officer, Sherry Guyon, had 
addressed the issue of re-opening the record in a decision prior 
to the case at bar. In Kent v. Dept. of Employment Security, 10 
CSRB/H.O. 138 (Step 5 Decision on Motion to Reopen Hearing), Ms. 
Guyon held that the counterpart to the current rule on closing 
the record did not permit a re-opening of the record: 
"By making a very strict interpretation of 
R140-1-20E (now R137-1-20E), the Hearing 
Officer concludes that it would be an abuse 
of discretion to re-open a hearing for 
additional evidence, testimony or documents, 
once it has been formally closed, because no 
specific provisions are set forth to do so." 
Id.P at 2. (A copy of the Decision on Motion 
to Reopen Hearing is set forth in the 
Addendum). 
Finally, UDOT's counsel did not dispute Lunnen's argument 
that Mr. Martinez could not re-open the record once it was 
closed: 
"Agency is extremely concerned and troubled 
by the procedure used by the Hearing Officer 
in this case. Counsel for Agency has in fact 
submitted Memorandums to at least one 
different Hearing Officer arguing that once 
the record is closed, a decision MUST be made 
on the evidence presented at the hearing and 
that it is inappropriate to give a party 
another bite at the apple." Agency's Step 6 
Brief, at 21. (Emphasis in original). 
In spite of UDOT's admission and Ms. Guyon's decision, the 
CSRB ruled Ms. Guyon's decision to be correct but that the 
Hearing Officer has independent authority anyway to re-open the 
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hearing. The CSRB's analysis is predicated upon its reading of 
R137-1-20J: 
"Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing 
officer finds that the action complained of 
which was taken by the appointing authority 
was too severe, even though for good cause, 
the hearing officer may provide for such 
other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate 
and in the best interest of the respective 
parties." 
The CSRB asserts this rule modifies the provision concerning 
closing the record set forth in R137-1-20E such that a Hearing 
Officer may re-open the record. The CSRB's analysis ignores the 
unambiguous language and intent of subsection J in that this 
subsection grants the Hearing Officer authority to fashion a 
remedy he/she believes appropriate based on the record. Nowhere 
does this subsection hint that the Hearing Officer is granted 
authority to open a record once the same has been closed. 
The Step 5 Hearing Officer and the CSRB did not act 
reasonably or rationally in interpreting the rules adopted by the 
CSRB. This Court should so hold that the Hearing Officer had no 
authority to re-open the record. 
III. 
UDOT DID NOT PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF 
CONSISTENT APPLICATION AT THE EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING. 
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence to be 
"that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate 
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to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 861 P.2d 414, 428 (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, the trier of fact (the Hearing Officer) 
was never persuaded that UDOT had presented any pertinent or 
persuasive evidence on the consistency of the discipline imposed. 
The only evidence presented on the issue was by Gene 
Sturzenegger. That complete testimony is as follows: 
HQ. Is this a situation where Mr. Lunnen is 
the first individual that has been 
disciplined with a demotion because of 
failure to respond to call outs? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you in the district knowledge of any 
other person that has been demoted for a 
similar offense? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you recall — do you recall when 
this took place? 
A. It was about two years ago, roughly, the 
individual is off of the Tooele Station, 
Station 223. 
Q. Was it your recommendation from the 
district that this particular individual be 
terminated? 
A. He was a Grade 17 as I recall, and we 
recommended termination. It was changed at a 
later date with the concurrence of the 
district and changed to a Grade 15, demoted 
to Grade 15 with ten or so percent cut in 
salary. 
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Q. And do you recallf without going into all 
of the details, just exactly why he was? Did 
he just not respond once or what was the 
situation? 
A. There was quite a few times that he 
didn't respond. Either the last event was, 
you know, just not responding for snow 
removal. You know, his home was called, he 
was there, he didn't respond." Step 5 
transcript at 18-19. 
In his Final Decision, the Hearing Officer characterized the 
foregoing testimony as what UDOT "thought" was appropriate 
discipline. The Hearing Officer simply did not find the evidence 
to be persuasive or credible. The Hearing Officer further 
believed UDOT was principally asserting Lunnen's insubordination 
as a basis for demotion because that was the heart of UDOT's 
closing argument: 
"We believe that the disciplinary action is 
fair in light of the infraction and the 
offense that he committed, which was 
insubordination. He was insubordinate, was 
nonfeasance and misfeasance existed in this 
failure to respond to the direction that he 
received, particularly after he acknowledged 
it. With this we conclude our arguments that 
we feel that the action of the department 
should be sustained by the hearing officer." 
Step 5 transcript, at 206. 
Despite not hearing the testimony of Mr. Sturzenegger nor 
the arguments of UDOT's representative, the CSRB usurped the 
Hearing Officer's province by deciding the credibility of a 
witness (Mr. Sturzenegger) and determining his testimony to be 
substantial and credible evidence. If the Hearing Officer 
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thought the evidence was sufficient and substantialf the Hearing 
Officer would have had no occasion to improperly re-open the 
record! 
Moreover, the CSRB totally ignored UDOT's argument contained 
in the transcript that UDOT believed a demotion was appropriate 
because of the nature of the misconduct — insubordination1 The 
CSRB opines that UDOT's demotion of Lunnen was not solely because 
of insubordination but was also because of poor performance in 
the past. Yet the CSRB again completely ignores Joint Exhibits 1 
and 2, which are performance ratings covering the time period of 
July 1, 1990 through June 30, 1992. In those evaluations, Lunnen 
was rated successful overall in his performance. While he did 
receive a less than successful rating on the "24 hour call" 
obligation, Lunnen nevertheless received successful ratings. If 
Lunnen is a successful employee, then how can he be demoted for 
this successful performance? The answer is that he cannot and 
the CSRB's reliance on Lunnen's performance as a basis for 
demotion is not supported by the record. 
Furthermore, the Hearing Officer properly understood the 
importance of Lunnen's performance evaluations in his Interim 
Order: 
"The Agency offered one instance of 
insubordination and a commensurate demotion 
as proof of consistency of application. 
Taking into account the long and valued work 
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performance of Lunnen, it does not appear 
that a demotion for this act is consistent 
with prior discipline imposed by the Agency.M 
Step 5 Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Interim Order With 
Continuing Jurisdiction, at page 8. 
The CSRB cannot "pick and choose" the evidence it wants to 
consider. The CSRB must consider the totality of the evidence 
presented. The CSRB did not consider the performance evaluations 
of Lunnen in deciding this case nor the credibility of the 
witness. The CSRB's decision simply ignores the straight-forward 
evidence in the record. The CSRB's decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence and must be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision of the Career Service 
Review Board and order that UDOT had the burden of proof 
regarding consistent application of discipline and that it failed 
to carry that burden by presenting substantial, credible evidence 
on the issue. This Court should further order that Lunnen be 
reinstated to his former position, with back pay, for the reason 
that UDOT failed to carry its burden of proof. 
Dated this / / day of / f c y , 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
k/mi/Lunnen.bri/APPl 
25 
Phillip W. Dyer 
Attorney for Petitioner Lunnen 
ADDENDUM 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: : 
JAMES M. LUNNEN, : DECISION AND FINAL 
Grievant, : AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
: Case Nos. 5 CSRB 46 (Step 6) 
Agency. : 11 CSRB/H.O. 154 (Step 5) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate review 
of the above-captioned matter on August 12, 1993. The following Board Members heard oral 
argument and later deliberated in the decision-making process: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, Jean 
M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo. James M. Lunnen (Mr. Lunnen and 
Appellant) was not present, but was represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, as 
counsel to the Utah Public Employees' Association. Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. 
Schwendiman, Office of the Attorney General, represented the Utah Department of 
Transportation (Department and UDOT). A certified court reporter from Tempest Reporting 
made a verbatim record of oral argument before the Board, which is commonly referred to as 
a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 
AUTHORITY 
The CSRB's statutory provisions are set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah 
Code Unannotated (1993 Supp.). Effective November 2,1992, the CSRB's provisions at R137-1-
20 C. and -21 D. were amended through the State's rulemaking procedures at §§63-46a et seq. 
These amended provisions are applicable to the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings in this matter, 
which occurred on November 10 and 13, 1992. 
This case proceeded properly through the State's grievance procedures, and the Board 
has assumed jurisdiction over Mr. Lunnen's appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or Board-level review 
constitutes the final step in the administrative review under the codified Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures, according to §§67-19a-202(l)(a), -407 and -408, as well as constituting a final agency 
action under §63-46b-14 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). All UAPA formal 
adjudicatory provisions are applicable to the CSRB's proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. After 
closing the record following oral argument, the Board Members entered into an executive 
session for deliberation and decision-making. 
After considering the record as a whole and the arguments presented at the Board-level 
hearing, the Board sustains the Step 5 Decision and denies Mr. Lunnen's appeal. 
ISSUES 
A. Issues Adjudicated at Step 5 Hearing 
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings as the 
issues to be adjudicated: 
1. Was Grievant demoted for just cause? 
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy? 
On these issues, the CSRB hearing officer ruled that just cause supported Mr. Lunnen's 
demotion, and that his penalty was neither excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Issues Presented on Appeal to Step 6 
Mr. Lunnen comes before this Board arguing three issues upon appeal to Step 6. First, 
Appellant argues that the Department failed to carry its burden of proof; therefore, his 
disciplinary penalty should be vacated, and that Mr. Lunnen should be reinstated to his former 
Grade 19 position and his lost pay restored. Second, Mr. Lunnen urges the Board to rule that 
its hearing officers do not have authority to reopen the record at Step 5 proceedings once the 
record has been closed. Third, Appellant Lunnen avers that the CSRB hearing officer violated 
the following: (a) provision §63-46b-10(3) of the UAPA, (b) the residuum rule, and (c) the 
Utah Court of Appeals' holding in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Ut. App. 
1991). (Hereinafter, the Tolman case.) 
C. The Board's Appellate Standards of Review 
. ? . 
Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended its standards of review provision at 
R137-1-21 D. Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to 
Mr. Lunnen's appeal to the Board at Step 6. The just-mentioned provision states: 
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of 
review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. If 
the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings 
of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has 
corrected the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 
record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the 
CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, 
with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision 
of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the 
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the 
ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the 
above provisions. 
The above-quoted provisions constitute the Board's standards by which this case will be 
reviewed. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Event Giving Rise to the Appeal 
Mr. Lunnen is a long term State career service employee. He has been employed with 
the Department continuously since being hired permanently on March 6, 1978, at a Grade 15. 
The Department promoted Appellant to Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, effective 
September 21, 1985. Four and one-half years later (April 1, 1989), Appellant Lunnen was 
promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19, a lead worker position. The State's 
classification specification for an employee in Mr. Lunnen's job title stipulates under the 
category of working conditions that an incumbent: " . . . may be subject to 24 hour call; may 
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be required to have access to an operating telephone or equivalent method of contact in case 
of emergency." (Jt. Exht. 4.) 
Paul Crosland, Mr. Lunnen's immediate supervisor, rated Lunnen on his FY90-91 
performance appraisal under the 24-hour call-out performance objective as borderline 
acceptable ("satisfactory/unsatisfactory"). Thus, Supervisor Crosland noted that Appellant 
Lunnen is "Sometime[s] hard to get a hold of for snow removal at night," (Jt. Exht. 1). By 
rating Mr. Lunnen as borderline or "S/U" for his poor call-out response record, Mr. Crosland 
had served warning on him regarding this problem. On the following year's FY91-92 
performance appraisal, Supervisor Crosland again cautioned Mr. Lunnen about his completely 
inadequate ("unsatisfactory") emergency call-out response record under the same 24-hour call-
out objective: "I need [your] help on call out[s] (may be subject to 24 hour call). Thank you 
for getting a phone again," (Jt. Exht. 2). Supervisor Crosland had now warned Mr. Lunnen for 
two consecutive years about the latter's inadequate emergency call-out response rate. 
During early 1992, Appellant further failed in responding to emergency call-outs. 
Additionally, for more than eight months he lacked a required residential telephone (Crosland, 
T. 62; Mrs. Lunnen, 142). Mr. Lunnen blamed personal bankruptcy problems for his lack of 
a residential telephone (T. 30), even though UDOT officials had offered him assistance in 
getting his telephone re-installed (T. 30-31). As Appellant lacked a residential telephone during 
this eight month period, Department officials provided him with a pager (T. 93), so that when 
paged, Mr. Lunnen either returned calls to Supervisor Crosland or showed up at the coded 
UDOT station appearing on his pager. When Mr. Lunnen twice complained that his pager 
didn't work properly, Mr. Crosland took it to be repaired and returned it to him on the same 
day (T. 73, 173). Each time the repair operator returned the pager in working condition. 
On April 2, 1992, Mr. Lunnen had been directed to meet with District 2 Maintenance 
Area Supervisor Ron Smith and Station Supervisor Paul Crosland concerning his continuing 
failure in not responding to several recent after-hours call-outs (T. 57-58). Mr. Lunnen .was 
informed that a disciplinary penalty would be imposed if he did not improve his call-out 
responses (T. 78). Supervisor Crosland expressed his extreme concern that Mr. Lunnen still 
lacked a telephone after more than eight months, and that Appellant was not yet responding 
to emergency call-outs as instructed. Appellant Lunnen was ordered to get a home telephone 
installed within two weeks (Jt. Exht. 5). Mr. Crosland informed Mr. Lunnen that he absolutely 
had to have a telephone as a continuing condition of his employment with UDOT. Appellant 
complied. 
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Other employees on Mr. Crosland's crew had long harbored ill feelings due to Mr. 
Lunnen's many absences on call-outs (T. 86-87). Appellant Lunnen's failure to respond in 
emergency situations placed a greater burden on his fellow crew members, who had to work 
additional hours (T. 21, 87). Mr. Lunnen's continued absences caused morale problems within 
Crosland's crew. Area Maintenance Supervisor Smith observed that Lunnen's history of not 
responding to call-outs dated back to 1983 (T. 54, 63). Supervisor Crosland also testified that 
Lunnen had a long history of not responding (T. 71, 79, 87), even though he had been twice 
promoted. 
UDOT District 2 Director Gene Sturzenegger later summarized this April 2 
meeting in his subsequent July 7, 1992 report: 
Mr. Lunnen was also told that if he didn't show a willingness to 
cooperate, make arrangements for a telephone and also be 
available for emergency call-outs, it would be necessary to 
recommend disciplinary action. Mr. Lunnen did arrange for a 
telephone one day after the deadline given him (Jt. Exht. 5). 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The above paragraph's content was originally conveyed to Mr. Lunnen in verbal context 
through his supervisors (Smith and Crosland) during their April 2 meeting with him. 
Importantly, Appellant Lunnen was placed on notice through a direct, specific verbal warning 
that he faced disciplinary action if he did not respond to call-outs, and if he did not obtain a 
telephone in his home. 
Next, Mr. Lunnen received a formal Warning Notice, dated June 16, 1992, from both 
Supervisor Crosland and UDOTs District 2 engineer that clearly stated Lunnen was still not 
properly responding to emergency call-outs upon being notified by telephone. The Warning 
Notice explained that Mr. Lunnen had again failed to report as directed during the evening of 
June 12, 1992, regarding the following incident: 
On June 12th, Mr. Lunnen was contacted by the dispatcher and 
asked to come to work as there was an emergency blowup of the 
concrete at 1-215 and approximately 700 West. Virgil Bair was 
waiting for Mr. Lunnen to help him on the road. After a 
considerable amount of time, Mr. Bair contacted the dispatcher 
[again] and asked that Mr. Lunnen be contacted again for an 
estimated time of arrival. At that time, Mr. Bair was informed 
that their [UHP Dispatch] call to Mr. Lunnen was answered by a 
machine and that Mr. Lunnen was not available. Personnel 
Bulletins state, "employee must be willing and able to work night 
shifts" and "may be subject to 24-hour call." (Jt. Exht. 3.) 
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The written Warning Notice by both the District 2 engineer and Station Supervisor Crosland 
carried a recommendation that Appellant be immediately demoted for his failure to report as 
directed during the emergency call-out on June 12. 
B. Departmental Proceedings 
District 2 Director Sturzenegger supported both supervisors' June 16 written Warning 
Notice's recommended demotion of Appellant based upon his failure in responding to the 
June 12 1-215 emergency call-out. In his July 7, 1992 recommendation for Mr. Lunnen's 
demotion, Director Sturzenegger considered Appellant's explanation for not responding to the 
June 12 emergency call-out, and found his explanation lacking credibility and his conduct 
inexcusable: 
. . . Mr. Lunnen was contacted by Highway Patrol Dispatch 
because of an emergency situation on 1-215. Mr. Lunnen 
answered the initial call and agreed to come to work. When he 
did not arrive, Dispatch was asked to contact him again and their 
call was answered by a machine saying he was not available. He 
was also paged and did not answer his pager. 
When Mr. Lunnen was asked why he did not respond, he said he 
thought someone was playing a joke on him because there was 
laughing and giggling on the telephone. 
In an effort to verify his statement, arrangements were made to 
listen to the tapes from Dispatch. There was no evidence of 
laughing and giggling, only a call requesting that he respond to an 
emergency on 1-215. He agreed to respond. The second call 
[s]hows that it was answered by an answering machine. A copy of 
this tape has been retained by the District for future use. 
The just-mentioned UHP Dispatch tape was submitted to and heard by the CSRB 
hearing officer (Finding of Fact No. 26). The Dispatch tape conveys Mr. Lunnen answering 
the telephone, receiving the call-out message, and agreeing to report to work, as instructed. 
But he did not report. Mr. Lunnen fully disregarded this call-out notification. The Dispatch 
operator called again about 30-45 minutes later but no one answered Mr. Lunnen's telephone. 
The Lunnens' telephone answering machine had been turned on and a message was left. 
Mr. Lunnen and his wife testified that it was not uncommon for those on Supervisor Crosland's 
crew to call each other during off-duty time, especially during televised sporting events, and 
pretend to report an emergency call-out. Mrs. Lunnen stated that the prank calls were more 
common during winter months, than during other seasons (T. 141). According to Appellant 
Lunnen, he, his wife, and his co-workers all participated in such pranks as a means of 
attempting to hoodwink each other into going out on a false report. At the Step 5 hearing, 
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Mr. Lunnen acknowledged that he did not properly respond to the June 12 emergency call-out, 
but defended his failure by laying blame on the prankster practice prevalent among Supervisor 
Crosland's crew. Mr. Lunnen's demotion was directly precipitated by his failure to report as 
directed during the June 12 evening emergency call-out on 1-215. 
On July 2, 1992, UDOT's District 2 director requested via memo to the Department's 
executive director that Mr. Lunnen be demoted from Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19 
to Grade 17, with an accompanying 11 percent salary reduction. On July 13, 1992, the 
Department's executive director notified Appellant Lunnen of his intent to demote him. 
Mr. Lunnen appealed the Department's proposed demotion. A three-member departmental 
grievance panel heard Mr. Lunnen's story and considered his appeal in an informal administra-
tive hearing. Afterwards, the three-person departmental grievance panel recommended to 
UDOT's executive director that Mr. Lunnen be demoted from Grade 19 to 17 but with an 
accompanying 2.75 percent salary reduction (a one-step reduction on the State's pay plan) 
rather than the previously proposed 11 percent. Effective August 15, 1992, Appellant was 
demoted and his pay rate decreased according to the grievance panel's recommendation. 
Mr. Lunnen properly and timely appealed this disciplinary penalty through the CSRB's 
grievance procedures at Steps 5 and 6. 
C. Interim Order 
The CSRB hearing officer issued his Step 5 Decision in two separate rulings. The first 
Step 5 ruling, issued on January 5, 1993, was entitled "Findings'of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Interim Order with Continuing Jurisdiction" (Interim Order). In that document, the trier 
of fact accepted the parties' joint stipulation of facts as the material factual basis of this case. 
The CSRB examiner supplemented the evidentiary record with his additional factual findings, 
and then made legal conclusions. Therein, the Interim Order assessed Mr. Lunnen's duty to 
comply with the call-out order given him by UHP Dispatch by telephone on June 12, against 
Mr. Lunnen's excuses for not complying: believing the call might be a purported telephone 
prank from one or more crew members, a family member mistakenly turning on his answering 
machine, and his pager not being activated that evening. The CSRB hearing officer considered 
the witnesses' demeanor, observed their degree of eye contact, their vocal responses along with 
tonal qualities, and weighed all testimonial and documentary evidence along with each 
witnesses' credibility. The transcript contains numerous inconsistencies when comparing 
Mr. and Mrs. Lunnens' testimony with that of the other witnesses. The trier of fact rejected 
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Mr. Lunnen's so-called prank alibi as an attempt to efface the latter's complete failure to 
comply with a valid, twice-made emergency call-out: 
Lunnen believes this is an intervening event [prank alibi] that 
does exculpate him. Lunnen did not verify with anyone at work 
that the call was not legitimate. Lunnen cannot validate his 
failure to respond by putting up a defense that is of his own 
creation. His non-response is not based upon legitimate grounds, 
but upon a reason that should not exist because it has the ability 
to harm someone or cause someone injury if the result is as in 
this case. (Interim Order, p. 7.) 
Having determined that Appellant Lunnen lacked a valid reason when he chose not to 
respond to the June 12 emergency call-out, the evidentiary examiner next essayed whether 
Mr. Lunnen's behavior warranted demotion as a proper disciplinary penalty for his failure to 
respond to a directly-requested emergency call-out. "There is no doubt [Lunnen] disobeyed 
the orders of a superior," concluded the CSRB hearing officer (Interim Order, p. 7). 
Disobedience to the orders of a superior is insubordination. The 
act is also malfeasance and misfeasance in that Lunnen did not do 
something he should have done and/or did it wrongfully. No 
matter how we characterize the act, it meets the requirement for 
discipline. (Ibid., pp. 7-8.) 
The evidentiary examiner further concluded that the Department had proper authority to 
discipline Mr. Lunnen, and that Appellant, in turn, had been insubordinate by his failure to 
obey the lawful order of a superior by taking into account Mr. Lunnen's prior knowledge that 
he was subject to 24-hour emergency call-out duty (Ibid. p. 9). 
After having concluded that some form of discipline was appropriate, the Interim Order 
considered the Department's particular sanction of a demotion. Specifically, the CSRB 
examiner contemplated whether a demotion from Grade 19 to 17 with an accompanying 2.75 
percent pay loss was consistent with other UDOT employees' disciplinary penalties for a first-
time insubordination incident. Opined the CSRB examiner in his Interim Order at page 8: 
The Agency [UDOT] offered one instance of insubordination and 
a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency of application. 
Taking into account the long and valued work performance of 
Lunnen, it does not appear that a demotion for this act is 
consistent with prior discipline imposed by [UDOT]. There is no 
dispute that Lunnen knew about the call-out policy of 24-hours 
and that he knew he was subject to it; but, there is no proof that 
it is a mandatory policy nor that anyone else has been disciplined 
for not responding to the call-out, except the one incident 
mentioned above. There is substantial evidence from both sides 
that any excuse for not responding was accepted as being valid. 
In this case, Lunnen had no excuse. 
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Noting that §67-19a-406 places the burden of proof on the Department in appeals 
stemming from demotion, the CSRB hearing officer observed that UDOT "has not provided 
any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of 
insubordination." (Ibid. p. 8.) Consequently, the CSRB hearing officer ordered that Lunnen's 
demotion and pay rate decrease be held in abeyance "pending proof by the [Department] that 
it is consistent with other similarly situated employees." UDOT was directed to submit "its best 
proof of what discipline is consistently given to employees of the [Department] for a first time 
insubordination, i.e., failure to obey the order of a supervisor," (Ibid, p. 9). According to the 
Step 5 Interim Order, should the Department be able to provide proof of consistent treatment 
for first time acts of insubordination, the examiner stated that he would "then ratify [Lunnen's] 
appropriate discipline." Otherwise, if UDOT failed to show consistency of discipline for 
similarly situated employees, the trier of fact would then "select the most appropriate one from 
those disciplines most regularly imposed," with any subsequent adjustment to Lunnen's grade 
and pay being adjusted later (Ibid., p. 9). The Interim Order concluded that "the record shall 
remain open" during the period UDOT submits its supporting evidence of previous demotion 
actions. 
D. Final Order 
On March 15, 1993, the CSRB examiner issued his "Final Order and Decision to Step 5 
Proceedings" (Step 5 Decision). Having previously established that UDOT had just cause to 
discipline Lunnen, the CSRB hearing officer now assessed "the degree of severity of the 
disciplinary penalty, since neither party had argued the issues of severity, consistency or latitude 
of discipline," (Step 5 Decision, p. 1). After considering a selection of UDOT case histories 
submitted pursuant to the Interim Order, regarding other previously disciplined UDOT 
employees charged with insubordination, the Step 5 Decision ultimately concluded that 
Mr. Lunnen's discipline was appropriately warranted, and was neither inconsistent nor 
excessive. 
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Appellant claims that the Department failed to carry its burden of proof with respect 
to the propriety of its disciplinary sanction. However, while Mr. Lunnen concedes that "UDOT 
presented substantial evidence of [his] misconduct," (Brief, p. 9), he asserts that UDOT "wholly 
failed to prove" the propriety of its demotion and salary reduction. Because our amended 
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evidentiaiy standard is a two-tier standard, we review R137-1-20 C. 1. and 2., and apply these 
provisions to Mr. Lunnen's factual situation. 
A. Burden of Proof - Misconduct Proved 
R137-1-20 C. 1. states: 
The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual findings based 
solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without deference 
to any prior factual findings of the agency. The CSRB hearing 
officer shall then determine whether: (a) the factual findings 
made from the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing support with substantial 
evidence the allegations made by the agency or the appointing 
authority, and (b) the agency had correctly applied relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes. 
In his Interim Order, the examiner explicitly found that: "There is no doubt Grievant 
disobeyed the orders of a superior. Disobedience to the orders of a superior is insubordina-
tion/' (Ibid, pp. 7-8.) Mr. Lunnen had received written notice on two consecutive annual 
performance appraisals of his unsatisfactory call-out record. He and Supervisor Crosland had 
engaged in many conversations over the years regarding this problem (T. 78, 86). Appellant 
had met with his supervisors on April 2, and was told specifically that his ongoing failure to 
adequately respond would result in discipline unless he improved his call-out response record. 
Supervisor Crosland's records show that Mr. Lunnen responded to only three call-outs during 
the period of January 1 through June 21, 1992, while he failed to respond to 11 other call-outs 
(T. 75). Appellant's response rate was only 20 percent for 3 out of 14 call-out requests in his 
crew. The next lowest response rate was 40 percent (Agency Exht. 1). Yet even after his 
supervisors' verbal warning on April 2, Lunnen did not respond on June 12, when he personally 
received a telephone call, acknowledged the UHP dispatcher's message to report, stated he 
would be responding, but for inexplicable reasons deliberately chose not to report. 
That evening Mr. Lunnen had been watching a basketball game on television when the 
call came about 10:00 p.m. The UHP Dispatch caller directed Appellant to report promptly 
to a section of ruptured concrete slab (a "blow up") emergency at 1-215 and 700 West. 
Appellant stated to the dispatcher that he would respond ("O. K."), but he did not. A half-
hour or more later, the dispatcher called again but found Mr. Lunnen's answering machine 
turned on, and no one picked up the incoming call. Dispatch also tried alerting Mr. Lunnen 
with the pager but he had not activated it. Appellants' witnesses testified that it was District 
2 policy to report if you were at home and got called out (T. 130, 134), as did Lunnen himself 
(T. 172). Moreover, Mr. Lunnen had known since his meeting with supervisors on April 2 that 
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he would be under penalty of discipline should he not improve his call-out response record 
(T. 86). 
Mr. Lunnen defended himself for the June 12 incident by claiming that he thought the 
Dispatch call had been made by fellow crew members, although none had called back to claim 
it was a prank. Both Appellant and his wife stated that with prank calls, someone always called 
shortly afterwards and identified the call as a prank (T. 171). No one really wanted a crew 
member to go out on a false report (T. 171). Appellant acknowledged that he had no 
reasonable basis upon which to believe that this call was anything but legitimate, and not bogus. 
Importantly, Mr. Lunnen had given no indication that he would not be responding nor did he 
verify with anyone at UDOT or UHP Dispatch that the call was not valid. Quite the opposite, 
Appellant stated that he would be responding that evening. Substantial evidence shows that 
Mr. Lunnen committed insubordination through his misconduct when he refused his 
supervisors' standing orders to respond to emergency call-outs when contacted, uniess not in 
a condition or circumstance to respond. 
UDOT effectively marshalled the evidence against Mr. Lunnen's wrongdoing at the 
evidentiary proceeding below. Even Appellant acknowledges such in his Brief at page 9: 
"Admittedly, UDOT presented substantial evidence of [Appellant's] misconduct . . . ." After 
hearing the evidence, the CSRB examiner then determined that under R137-1-20 C. 1., 
substantial evidence supported the Department's allegations of insubordination and misconduct 
as described in the executive director's July 13 and August 10 disciplinary action letters. We 
conclude that the evidentiary examiner made accurate factual findings, which were reasonable 
and rational based upon the record as a whole, as required by R137-1-20 C. 1. 
Next, the hearing officer complied with R137-1-20 C. 2., when he determined that 
Appellant's disciplinary sanction of a demotion and a one-step pay rate decrease was not 
excessive, disproportionate or abusive. 
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B. Burden of Proof - Penalty 
Appellant Lunnen argues that UDOT failed to meet its burden of proof on showing the 
propriety of a two-grade demotion coupled with a pay rate reduction.1 First, the codified 
grievance and appeal procedures place upon an agency the burden of proof in all disciplinary 
grievances, including demotions (§67-19a-406(2)(a)). Then the evidentiary examiner properly 
applied the Board's provision at R137-1-20 C. 2., which states: 
When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with 
the procedures set forth above that the evidentiary step 5 factual 
findings support the allegations of the agency or the appointing 
authority, then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether 
the agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanctions im-
posed, is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. In making this latter determination, the 
CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the decision of the 
agency or the appointing authority unless the agency's penalty is 
determined to be excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an 
abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB hearing officer 
shall determine the appropriate remedy. 
Mr. Lunnen has misread or misunderstood the examiner's Step 5 Decision with respect 
to the following portion that is quoted in Appellant's Brief at page 2: 
Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion For Reconsideration that the 
Agency did not prove a demotion was consistent discipline for one 
act of insubordination. That is true. 
But, importantly, continued the hearing officer, in the immediately following sentences: 
However, this does not invalidate the finding that Lunnen was, 
without doubt and by substantial proof, insubordinate and the 
only evidence received was that the reduction in grade was what 
the Agency thought was just and consistent with prior discipline. 
Therefore, it was for Lunnen's benefit that further proof of 
consistency was required. (Ibid., pp. 2-3.) 
The CSRB hearing officer did not state that Mr. Lunnen's discipline was not 
appropriate, as argued in the latter's Brief. Having found just cause to discipline Mr. Lunnen, 
the examiner stated that the remaining issue to be decided was that of "the degree of severity 
of the disciplinary penalty, since neither party had argued the issues of severity, consistency or 
latitude of discipline," (Step 5 Decision, p. 1). Contrary to Mr. Lunnen's argument that the 
hearing officer did not find his penalty "appropriate" (Brief, p. 9), the evidentiary examiner 
specifically determined that Lunnen's demotion was consistent with UDOT's other imposed 
sanctions "for one act of insubordination." Mr. Lunnen misreads the Step 5 Decision when 
he contends that the evidentiary record lacks substantial evidence for sustaining his 
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demotion—even on the basis of alleging a lack of consistent disciplinary application by the 
Department. 
The Interim Order states that, "The Agency offered one instance of insubordination and 
a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency of application" (Ibid., p. 8). Next, the 
hearing officer concluded: "The Agency has not provided any proof that the demotion of 
Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination" (Ibid.) On that basis, 
the trier of fact left the record open long enough for the Department to submit prior examples 
of other employees' demotions based upon a single act of insubordination. In contrast, the 
Board finds that the record of the Step 5 proceedings contains sufficient credible substantial 
evidence of UDOT's consistency of discipline upon which to satisfy the standard of R137-1-20 
C. 2. The record evidence, based upon the facts and circumstances of Mr. Lunnen's case, 
establishes just cause for his demotion and absent an excessive, disproportionate or abusive 
penalty. Consequently, the Board concludes that it was not necessary to have the Department 
further validate its decision by requiring an additional showing on the issue of consistency of 
discipline. (See below.) 
REOPENING THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD 
A. Resolution of Issues at Step 5 Proceedings 
In his Interim Order, the hearing officer sought to resolve three pertinent issues. The 
first issue concerned Mr. Lunnen's argument that UDOT had failed to implement a corrective 
action plan under R477-10-2. The trier of fact resolved this issue when he concluded that a 
corrective action plan would have been appropriate for a job performance problem, but not for 
Appellant's deliberate failure to report during an emergency call-out. Acts of willful 
misconduct fall under R477-11-1, which concerns insubordination, misfeasance, malfeasance and 
nonfeasance or disobeying the orders of a superior (Ibid, pp. 6-7). As to the second or 
misconduct issue, the examiner concluded that Mr. Lunnen had disobeyed the orders of a 
superior, and that his disobedience constituted insubordination (Ibid., pp. 7-8). According to 
the hearing officer, that left one last issue to be resolved: ". . . whether or not the demotion 
[of Mr. Lunnen] is consistent with other employees' disciplinary penalties for insubordination," 
(Ibid., p. 8). Continued the Interim Order: 'The Agency offered one instance of insubordina-
tion and a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency for insubordination." Yet in the 
following paragraph the Interim Order offers this contradictory statement: "The Agency has 
not provided any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one 
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act of insubordination/' Hence the CSRB hearing officer held the record open2 in order for 
the Department to submit supplemental proof of consistent discipline in first-act insubordina-
tion incidents. 
B. Adequate Credible Substantial Evidence in the Record 
The Step 5 proceedings' evidentiary record contains sufficiently credible substantial 
evidence anent UDOT's prior discipline for a one-act offense of insubordination. District 2 
Director Sturzenegger related an incident two years previously when another District 2 
employee, a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, assigned to UDOT Station 223 in 
Tooele, had repeatedly disregarded instructions to respond to emergency 24-hour call-outs, 
when notified (T. 18). According to Mr. Sturzenegger, that employee had been called "quite 
a few times" previously without responding (T. 19). On this occasion, the employee was at 
home; he was called, answered the Dispatch call, but deliberately failed to respond. The Tooele 
employee's insubordination resulted in a two-grade demotion coupled with a ten or eleven 
percent pay decrease3 (T. 19). Hence, there is sufficient credible substantial evidence in 
Director Sturzenegger's unrebutted testimony regarding the Tooele employee's insubordinate 
actions to support UDOT's demotion of Mr. Lunnen. This evidence meets the Department's 
burden of showing that it did not impose an excessive, disproportionate or abusive penalty upon 
Mr. Lunnen. Therefore, the Department was not required to show supplemental proof 
regarding consistent treatment vis-a-vis Mr. Lunnen's penalty. 
As the Department presented substantial evidence of a prior case in which a similarly 
situated UDOT employee was demoted two grades with an accompanying greater pay loss for 
not responding to call-outs after many efforts by his supervisors, we hold that the Step 5 
Interim Order's conclusionary finding ("The Agency has not provided any proof that the 
demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination.") is 
incorrect. However, it is clear from both the Interim Order and the final Step 5 Decision that 
the hearing officer committed a misstatement rather than harmful error. The evidentiary 
examiner's request for UDOT to produce more information regarding penalties for 
insubordinate employees only benefitted Mr. Lunnen. This error, which favored Mr. Lunnen, 
was de minimis, and neither harmful nor consequential to his interests. In sum, we conclude 
that it was a moot issue for our hearing officer to have requested supplemental disciplinary 
examples from UDOT regarding first-offense insubordination. 
Another aspect of the Step 5 proceedings compels clarification. The hearing examiner 
concentrated on Mr. Lunnen's failure in not reporting for an emergency call-out on June 12, 
-14-
after replying by telephone that he would. The hearing officer characterized this incident as 
"one act of insubordination/' and as "a first time insubordination/' (Interim Order, pp. 8, 9; 
also, Step 5 Decision, p. 2). We find that Mr. Lunnen's demotion and pay reduction was not 
limited to the single event of not responding on June 12. Rather, Appellant had been notified 
at his meeting with supervisors on April 2 that he needed to improve his call-out response. 
Also, his response rate from January through June 21 was an unacceptable twenty percent. 
Moreover, Appellant's performance appraisals for FY90-91 and 91-92 directed his attention to 
his continuing problem of not satisfactorily responding to emergency call-outs. Mr. Lunnen had 
a substantial work history of not properly responding to emergency call-outs. That unsatisfacto-
ry work history was pointed out in all three disciplinary documents: Sturzenegger's July 7 
letter, and the executive director's July 13 and August 13 letters (Jt. Exhts. 5, 6, 7). Each of 
these letters emphasized that Mr. Lunnen's insubordinate pattern and inadequate response 
record were the cause of his pending demotion, not just "one act of insubordination." The 
Department's penalty was based upon the totality of Mr. Lunnen's insubordinate behavior over 
a lengthy period of time, not just for his failure on June 12. 
C. Meeting Burden - Discipline 
The Department had the burden of proof when the Step 5 proceedings commenced 
(§67-19a-406(2)(a)). UDOT had the initial burden to show that its discipline was supported 
by just cause. Once the agency has shown that its disciplinary sanction was reasonable and 
correct in relation to the facts and circumstances, then the burden is on the employee to show 
that the penalty imposed was disproportionate or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion 
(R137-1-20 C. 2.). Certainly inconsistency of treatment between similarly situated employees 
could be a showing of disproportion, which could constitute an abuse of discretion. An abuse 
of discretion results when a sanction is so unreasonable that it offends reasonable minds. 
In Mr. Lunnen's situation, we conclude that there was a sufficiency of due process 
provided at the Step 5 proceedings to support just cause for the discipline (please refer to 
R477-11-1, Disciplinary Action). 
D. Reopening Step 5 Proceedings 
At the conclusion of Mr. Lunnen's Step 5 proceeding on November 13,1992, the CSRB 
hearing officer remarked in his closing comment: 
HEARING OFFICER: Thank you very much. That will close 
argument in this case. An opinion will be rendered in writing in 
twenty days beginning tomorrow to be provided to both parties 
and counsel. I appreciate your professionalism, and it's been a 
pleasure to have you before me (T. 217). 
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Concededly, the hearing examiner had indeed "closed argument," although his exact words did 
not state that he had actually closed the record. However, the evidentiary examiner's wording 
implies a closing of the evidentiary record at that time. Hence, we assume that the record was 
intended to be closed and was, in fact, closed at that time. 
In his Interim Order, under the section labeled "Order," the Step 5 hearing officer 
stated: 
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record 
shall remain open. This hearing and its record shall remain open 
for purposes of appeal by Grievant until the discipline is imposed 
and the time for appeal shall commence subsequent to a modifica-
tion of this Order which imposes the discipline (Page 9). 
However, Mr. Lunnen argues in his Brief (pp. 9-10) that, "Step 5 hearing officers do not 
have authority to reopen the record." In support, Appellant cites our rule at R137-1-20 E.4 
Appellant Lunnen further avers that the CSRB's rules only provide for the record remaining 
open where, under R137-1-20 F., the parties agree to submit posthearing briefs. According to 
Mr. Lunnen, "Absent such an agreement, R137-1-20 E. prohibits the presentation of further 
evidence and the hearing officer is thereafter required to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law pursuant to R137-1-20 G." To further support his position, Appellant has 
included another CSRB hearing officer's ruling which denied an agency's request to re-open 
a Step 5 proceeding several days after the record was closed and the proceeding had adjourned. 
The agency in Charles D. Kent v. Utah Department of Employment Security, 10 CSRB/H.0.138, 
had requested to re-open the evidentiary proceedings to offer rebuttal testimony from a witness 
not previously called but referred to in the grievant's testimony. Basing her denial on R137-1-
20 E., the Board's hearing officer concluded that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for 
her to re-open a hearing for the taking of additional evidence, once it had been formally closed. 
The basis for that hearing officer's denial was "because no specific provisions are set forth to 
do so." In the given circumstances, that hearing officer's decision was reasonable and legally 
supportable. The Board determined that is was not necessary to re-open the hearing because 
there was ample substantial evidence in the record to otherwise reach a proper decision {Kent, 
p. 12). 
There are provisions that enable our factfinders to obtain additional information within 
their discretionary ambit. For example, R137-1-17 A. states: 
Conduct. The purpose of a hearing is to provide a fair and 
impartial opportunity to be heard so that the hearing officer may 
be completely informed in the matter and enabled to render a 
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proper determination based on all the facts and applicable laws 
and rules. 
Thus, to "be completely informed in the matter" a hearing officer may require additional 
information from time to time. Also, R137-1-20 F. provides for the admission of posthearing 
briefs and memoranda of law to be submitted along with "posthearing documents." That 
provision may be read in concert with R137-1-20 A., which charges the hearing examiner to 
"insure the development of a clear and complete record." Of particular import is R137-1-20 
J.: 
Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing officer finds that the 
action complained of which was taken by the appointing authority 
was too severe, even though for good cause, the hearing officer 
may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed appropri-
ate and in the best interest of the respective parties. 
A hearing officer may well have a complete and correct understanding of all case facts, 
all applicable rules and laws, and have all relevant pieces of information sorted out at the 
conclusion of the hearing. But not always. Hearing officers may need further time and 
opportunity after the evidentiary hearing to analyze and weigh evidence, and sort out the 
relevant information from the non-relevant. We hold that the hearing officer's sua sponte 
request for additional information in Lunnen, where he issued a subsequent Interim Order 
delineating the information he should receive from the agency, is not contrary to the CSRB 
hearing officer's ruling in Kent, above. In the Kent decision, an agency sought on its own 
motion to rebut testimony by later supplementing the Step 5 record after the record had been 
closed and the proceedings adjourned. The facts and circumstances of both cases are 
substantially different, and the exigencies of each case resulted in proper but different 
discretionary decisions by our hearing officers. 
Essentially, we hold that where our hearing officer reasonably justifies re-opening a 
Step 5 proceeding, that our hearing officer has sufficient discretion and authority to do so to 
satisfy the ends of justice, to conduct a full and fair hearing, and to make a complete record. 
The UAPA does not prohibit the CSRB hearing officer/presiding officer from re-opening an 
evidentiary proceeding. 
THE UAPA, THE RESIDUUM RULE, AND THE TOLMAN CASE 
According to Mr. Lunnen, the Step 5 Decision violated the UAPA, the residuum rule, 
and Utah Court of Appeals' holding in the Tolman case. These claimed violations challenge 
the Interim Order's request for and the Step 5 Decision's acceptance of what the hearing 
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officer called the Department's "best proof of what discipline is consistently given to employees 
of the Agency for a first time insubordination, i.e., failure to obey the order of a supervisor/' 
(page 9). Specifically, Appellant objects to UDOT's posthearing submission of hearsay 
evidence because he was not allowed to cross-examine any witnesses on the materials' 
foundation, factual basis or trustworthiness. Mr. Lunnen feels strongly that his due process 
rights have been violated by the process used to bring these documents into the record below. 
This tribunal has given serious consideration to Appellant's argument. We understand 
Mr. Lunnen's concerns regarding UDOT's evidence that was received after the evidentiary 
proceeding went off the record. Furthermore, the Board comprehends the hearing officer's 
purpose in requesting additional proof from the Department on the issue of consistency and 
proportionate discipline between Mr. Lunnen and other UDOT employees previously 
disciplined for similar acts of insubordination. 
Grievance hearings are neither criminal nor civil proceedings, and different legal 
standards and procedures apply. With sufficient due process granted to both parties, the 
hearing officer may need to gather additional facts and information on matters specific to a 
case. Whether to "re-open" the entire proceeding or just the record falls within the hearing 
officer's discretion. In the Lunnen case, the hearing officer was charged to adjudicate two 
general issues/queries: (1) Did the Department have just cause to demote Mr. Lunnen?, and 
(2) If not, what is the appropriate remedy? Conceivably, answering these two issues may 
require additional factfinding after the evidentiary proceeding has been closed. In writing a 
factually accurate and a well reasoned decision, the hearing officer may require that further 
factual information be adduced, so that all issues raised are adequately addressed and 
purposefully resolved. This is to be accomplished temperately and with a mind to each party's 
proper burdens. Burdens can and do shift on occasion during administrative proceedings. To 
re-open or request additional information is not exclusively advantageous to one party or 
another. 
The CSRB's rules permit the Board to remand a case to the original hearing officer for 
additional evidence-taking (R137-1-21 G.). Another provision, R137-1-21 H. 3., permits the 
Board to re-open a case and supplement or amend the record. Also, the Board has authority 
to compel new or additional evidence on its own motion (§67-19a-202(3)(c) and R137-1-21 B.). 
The Board, then, has several means of gaining additional information even though the 
evidentiary record below has long been closed. However, our appointed hearing officers retain 
. ia . 
jurisdiction until giving up that jurisdiction to the Board at Step 6. If circumstances compel, 
our hearing officers may circumspectly re-open the record for further evidence-gathering. 
Moreover, either party to a grievance hearing may request a reconsideration at Step 5 
(R137-1-20 M.) or Step 6 (R137-1-21 J.), which is a re-examination of a decision permitted by 
law (§63-46b-13). 
We conclude that it is not necessary to rule upon Mr. Lunnen's third issue, because the 
record contains District Director Sturzenegger's clear testimony that constitutes sufficient 
credible substantial evidence—which was unrefuted by Mr. Lunnen. The hearing officer did 
not need to request additional "best proof from UDOT because Director Sturzenegger's 
testimony of the District 2 Tooele employee's misconduct and disciplinary penalty satisfies the 
element of consistency and shows just cause for Mr. Lunnen's penalty under the CSRB's 
standard at R137-1-20 C. 2. Consequently, because the case record, through the transcript, 
contains sufficient evidence to satisfactorily determine the issue of consistency/abusive 
discipline, we do not need to address the particular hearsay elements associated with the 
UAPA, the residuum rule or with the Tolman case. Thus, having considered these three points 
and finding them moot, it is not necessary to further address them. 
DECISION 
The hearing officer's Step 5 Decision is affirmed. Mr. Lunnen's appeal to Step 6 is 
denied, and therefore his remedy or relief cannot be granted. We hope that through improved 
conduct he may be promoted again to a Grade 19 at an appropriate time. The record shows 
that Mr. Lunnen has many good qualities, enjoys the support of his family, and has provided 
many years of service to the state of Utah and the Department. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
David M. Hilbig, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
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DATED this ^ ^ Z day of October 1993. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairma 
Career Service" 
-20-
ENDNOTES 
1. Mr. Lunnen's Brief at pages 2 and 9 mentions an eleven percent pay rate reduction. However, that percentage is incorrect as the penalty rate imposed 
was actually 2.75 percent (Jt. Exht. 7), which constituted the percentage amount between steps on the Legislature's ncwrv authorized "step pay plan." 
In Jury 1992, the State adopted the new "step pay plan" enacted during the Legislature's 1992 general session. See also. Interim Order, Fmding No. 13 
Thus. Mr. Lunnen's actual pay rate decrease was much less severe than he presented in his Step 6 Brief 
2. As stated on the Interim Order's last page: 
. . . (T]he Agency had the authority to discipline Lunnen and that Lunnen was insubordinate . The 
discipline imposed shall be held in abeyance pending proof by the Agency that it is consistent with other 
similarly situated employees. The Agency shall submit to this Hearing Officer . . . its best proof of what 
discipline is consistently given to employees of the Agency for a first time insubordination, i. e., failure 
to obey the order of a superior . . . . 
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record shall remain open . . . . 
3. There is ambiguity in the record as to whether the Tooele employee received a ten or an eleven percent pay 
reduction. Both figures were cited side by side. 
4 R137-1-20 E. reads: 
Closing of the Record. After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments have been presented, 
the hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the proceeding, unless one or both parties agree 
to submit a postheanng brief within a specified time. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21J and Utah Code UnannotaUd, 
§63-46b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code UnannotaUd, 
§63-46b-14 and -16. 
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AUTHORITY 
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Interim Order With 
Continuing Jurisdiction issued by this Hearing Officer on January 5, 1993, and to 
R137-1-20 A., which states that a Hearing Officer may require evidence be produced, 
separate and apart from that received in a hearing, as governed by R137-1-20 B., this Final 
Order issues. 
Also, pursuant to R137-1-20 J., the CSRB Hearing Officer may, after finding 
sufficient cause for sustaining disciplinary action by an agency, provide for a remedy or relief 
"as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the respective parties." 
In this case the Hearing Officer found, and so held in bis Interim Order, that the 
Agency had just cause to discipline Grievant for insubordination. The reniaming issue to 
be decided then was the degree of severity of the disciplinary penalty, since neither party 
had argued the issues of severity, consistency or latitude of discipline. Therefore, pursuant 
to R137-1-20 J., this Hearing Officer issued his Interim Order, which included both Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but which delayed any finding on severity of Agency' s 
action pending further submission by the parties and in the best interests of the respective 
parties. 
Since the issuance of the Interim Order, Mr. Lunnen, Grievant, has objected to the 
submission of further evidence to this Hearing Officer. See Lunnen Memorandums dated 
January 13,1993, and February 3,1993. The Agency submitted its requested documentation 
on January 25,1993. Grievant fs main objection is that this Hearing Officer was prohibited 
from accepting or requiring further evidence in this case once the hearing day was over. 
Pursuant to the above citations, Hearing Officers are given wide latitude in seeking to do 
justice to the respective parties. In this specific case, Mr. Lunnen filed a Request For 
Reconsideration, which basically stated that the Agency did not meet its burden of proof; 
therefore, the supplemental information could not be introduced. What Mr. Lunnen did not 
address in his Motion is that the Interim Order issued states emphatically that Mr, Lunnen 
was insubordinate, on that issue the Agency fully met its burden. Therefore, the 
supplemental evidence sought, which as noted in the Interim Order that the record would 
remain open, was not further testimony or argument but rather proof of consistent 
discipline. The only information sought by the Hearing Officer was, "What is the 
appropriate punishment for insubordination at UDOT?* 
Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion For Reconsideration that the Agency did not prove 
a demotion was consistent discipline for one act of insubordination. That is true. However, 
this does not invalidate the finding that Lunnen was, without doubt and by substantial proof, 
insubordinate and the only evidence received was that the reduction in grade was what the 
Agency thought was just and consistent with prior discipline. Therefore, it was for Lunnen• s 
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benefit that further proof of consistency was required. Lunnen further argues, in his second 
Memorandum, that this Hearing Officer is barred by the "residuum rule" as stated in the 
case of Toknan v. Salt Lake County, which bars "all hearsay and other legally inadmissible 
evidence." What Mr. Lunnen is saying is that the Agency' s subsequent submissions are 
hearsay and/or legally inadmissible. What the court in Tolman was referring to was due 
process. Do the parties have the ability to confront and examine the witnesses against 
them? In this case there has been no objection to the evidence introduced and accepted 
at the hearing. The subsequent submissions were provided to both parties. No objection 
to the materials provided has been made by Mr. Lunnen; he has argued against their being 
received, but receipt of these documents has only been to assist in the provision of an 
appropriate remedy, not to assist in the determination of guilt or innocence. This specific 
bifurcation is allowed by R137-1-20 J. 
Does the above rule allow for subsequent information to be received? The Hearing 
Officer may provide for 'other relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the 
respective parties," through the receipt of information pursuant to R137-1-20 A. so long as 
each party' s due process is protected. In this case the parties each had full opportunity to 
provide subsequent information dealing with consistent discipline for the behavior found to 
be insubordinate and to further contest the information provided. 
As an exhibit to his final Memorandum, Mr. Lunnen attached a copy of the Parker 
v. Utah Department of Corrections, 5 CSRB 42, (Step 6) issued 28 January 1993. Although 
issued after the hearing of the above parties, it does have some clarification useful to this 
case. The Parker Order cites R137-1-20 J. at page 5. In its discussion of the rule the Career 
Service Review Board states that the determination of whether "discipline as excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion" is inherent in the process 
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of rendering a decision. The Hearing Officer must give latitude and consideration to an 
agency's decision when supported factually. 
Parker does not state that a case cannot be bifurcated nor evidence received on the 
narrow issue of consistency of discipline nor as a basis to give latitude and consideration to 
an agency • s discipline. What Parker does say is that whatever method of evidence gathering 
is used, when permissible, it must be fair to both parties. In this case, the latitude given to 
the Agency, as well as the consistency of imposing demotion, were not adequately addressed 
at the hearing by either party; therefore, fairness to both sides dictated further 
documentation to the issue. This in no way impinges on the finding that Mr. Lunnen was 
insubordinate. The supplemental issue only pertained to his demotion. 
The reason for the supplemental information was to be fair and not have the Hearing 
Officer ratify a discipline inconsistent with prior Agency imposition with the possibility of 
being overly harsh on the Grievant. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the information submitted by the Agency pursuant to the Interim Order 
and Grievant's failure to contest either the sufficiency or veracity of that information as 
well as both the consistency and severity of the Agency • s use of demotion as a discipline 
when employees have been insubordinate, it is hereby held that the Agency' s discipline was 
neither excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Mr. Lunnen's 
grievance remedy seeking a lesser discipline is denied and the Agency' s discipline is upheld. 
Additionally, Grievant's Motion For Reconsideration, although untimely, has been 
considered and discussed above, and is also denied. 
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^ _ « 
DATED this /i> day of March 1993. 
Michael N. Martinez <^7 
CSRB Hearing Officer 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration muit be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision. (Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-20 M.) 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten working 
days upon receipt of this decision. (Utah Cod* Unannotated (1983 Supp.), 567-19a-407(l)(a)(i).) 
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
JAMES M. LUNNEN, 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND INTERIM ORDER 
WITH CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION 
Case No. CSRB/H.0.154 
AUTHORITY 
In compliance with Utah Code Annotated §67-19a-406, an administrative hearing at 
Step 5 was held on Tuesday, November 10,1992. James M. Lunnen (Grievant) was present 
and represented by Thomas R. Bielen, Utah Public Employees' Association; the Utah 
Department of Transportation (Department) was represented by Grant S. Fairbanks, Human 
Resource Manager. A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings; testimony 
and documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses were placed under 
oath. This Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-2(l)(h)) now 
makes and enters the following: 
STIPULATED FACTS 
The parties, by and through their representatives, stipulated and agreed that the 
following facts shall be deemed conclusively admitted as to all parties: 
1. Mr. Lunnen was hired by the Utah Department of Transportation as a 
probationary employee, Schedule "B," on March 6, 1978. 
2. On September 21, 1985, Grievant was promoted to a Highway Operations 
Specialist, Grade 17. 
3. On April 1, 1989, Grievant was promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, 
Grade 19. 
4. The Job Specification for a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19, indicates 
that the incumbent may be subject to 24 hour call-out. 
5. Because of Grievant' s assignment, he received a pager approximately the same 
time that he was promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19. 
6. On April 2,1992, Grievant was called to a meeting. Present at the meeting were: 
Mr. Lunnen; Ron Smith, Area Supervisor; Paul Crossland, Supervisor; and Gloria Hunt, 
District Administrative Coordinator. 
7. On June 22,1992, Grievant was given a warning notice dated June 16,1992, which 
indicated a problem with not responding to a call-out. 
8. On July 7,1992, a memo was sent to Eugene Findlay, Executive Director of the 
Utah Department of Transportation, by Gene Sturzenegger, District 2 Director, requesting 
that Grievant be demoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, and be given an 
11% reduction in salary. 
9. On July 13,1992, Mr. Findlay sent a memo to Grievant that informed him that 
he would be demoted. 
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10. The Grievant appealed this proposed demotion. 
11. Mr. Findlay appointed Howard Richardson, Deputy Director, to hear the appeal. 
Mr. Richardson was assisted by Lester Jester, Engineer for Maintenance; Heber Vlam, 
Engineer for Standards and Special Studies; and Grant Fairbanks, Human Resource 
Director. 
12. A hearing was held on August 3, 1992, regarding the proposed demotion. 
13. As a result of the aforementioned hearing, the Department board recommended 
that a demotion from Grade 19 to Grade 17 with a 2.75% reduction in pay be assessed. 
14. On August 10,1992, Mr. Findlay sent a memo to Grievant which indicated that 
Lunnen would be demoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, effective 
August 15, 1992. 
15. Mr. Lunnen was demoted to Grade 17 and given a salary reduction to $11.62 
effective August 15,1992. 
16. Mr. Lunnen appealed this aforementioned demotion to the fifth step of the 
grievance process. 
17. Joint Exhibit 1, a UDOT Performance Review of Lunnen, for the period 7/1/90 
- 6/30/91 evidences an "S/U" rating, which is a cross between •successful" and 
"unsuccessful" in the "24-Hour Call" objective. Paul Crossland wrote of Lunnen: 
•Sometime [sic] hard to get a hold of for snow removal at night." 
18. Joint Exhibit 2, a UDOT Performance Review of Lunnen, for the period 7/1/91 
- 6/30/92, evidences an unsatisfactory rating on the "24«Hour Call" objective. Crossland 
wrote of Lunnen that Lunnen "may be" subject to 24 hour call-out. Crossland thanked 
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Lunnen for installing a phone in his residence. Testimony relevant to this exhibit stated that 
Crossland was reinforcing the 24 hour call-out provision in Lunnen • s job duties. Crossland 
also wanted to reinforce the fact that a phone was a requirement of the job. 
19. Joint Exhibit 3, a UDOT Warning Notice to Lunnen, dated June 16,1992, and 
signed by both Lunnen and Crossland, states that Lunnen did not respond to an emergency 
call-out and upon a subsequent attempt to telephonically contact Lunnen, an answering 
machine informed the dispatcher that the Lunnens were not at home. The exhibit further 
states that a demotion for Lunnen will be recommended to the Executive Director. 
20. Joint Exhibit 5, a memorandum from Gene Sturzenegger to Gene Findlay, 
UDOT Executive Director, details Lunnen's history regarding 24 hour call-outs and 
recommends a demotion. 
21. Joint Exhibit 4 is a class specification of the Utah Department of Human 
Resource Management (DHRM) for Lunnen's position. The class specification states that 
the employee's working conditions: 
may be subject to 24 hour call; may be required to have access 
to an operating telephone or equivalent method of contact in 
case of emergency. 
22. Agency Exhibit 1, as testified to by Crossland, is a record of the after hours call-
outs made to Lunnen and others on his crew between January 1, 1992, and June 21,1992. 
The exhibit shows that Lunnen responded to after hour calls 3 of 14 times. This is a 20% 
response rate. The next lowest response was 40%, according to Crossland. 
23. Based upon the low response to call-outs by Lunnen, Crossland called Lunnen 
into a meeting on April 2,1992. Lunnen was informed that disciplinary action would follow 
if he did not improve his response to call-outs. Tlu- basis for the needed improvement, 
according to Crossland, was that a "no show" placed crew members at risk because they 
had to work longer hours to remove snow. That, coupled with bad weather and fatigue 
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which they experienced while working longer hours, placed them in danger. 
24. Crossland stated that there was no criteria nor policy determinative of what 
percentage of call-outs each crew member was required to adhere to. 
25. During the eight months Lunnen was without a phone* a pager had been 
provided to him. Lunnen and Crossland had a code devised which informed Lunnen if he 
should merely call in or or whether he should show up at the station in response to the 
page. Lunnen stated that several times he checked the pager and it appeared not to be in 
working order. Each report of an inoperable pager was responded to by repairing the pager 
by the end of the shift. 
26. On June 12, 1992, a tape was made of the call by dispatch to the Lunnen 
residence. The tape was played for this hearing officer and is a part of the record, although 
not a part of the transcript due to the multiple voices on the tape. The dispatcher called 
while Lunnen and a friend were watching a televised basketball game at approximately 
10:00 p.m. The dispatcher informed Lunnen that there had been a concrete buckle on 
1-215. Lunnen responded "ok". Approximately one-half hour later, a dispatcher again 
called the Lunnen residence and a machine answered the phone. Lunnen did not respond 
to the emergency. 
27. Lunnen and his wife testified that it is common among the crew members to call 
each other during televised sporting events and pretend there has been a call-out. Lunnen 
and his wife have both participated in these pranks. Lunnen believed the call of June 12, 
1992, to be such a prank, but he could not verify it because other pranksters were not 
answering their phone when Lunnen tried to call them. 
28. It was this failure to respond to the June 12,1992 call-out that led to Lunnen's 
demotion. 
29. But for the call-out situation at issue, Lunnen was a satisfactory employee who 
had been recommended for a promotion from Grade 17 to Grade 19, by Crossland, due to 
his ability and hard work. Lunnen has worked at UDOT since 1978 and has no other 
disciplinary record. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. State of Utah, DHRM R477-11-2 states that an employee may be demoted for 
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cause as listed in R477-10-2 and R47741-1 of the rules, 
2. R477-10-2 governs corrective actions. Pursuant to this rule, which governs conduct 
other than "willful misconduct," corrective action shall consist of one or more of a number 
of actions, pursuant to a written plan. 
3, R477-1M governs disciplinary actions. Disciplinary action may be instituted for, 
among other reasons, insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a superior. The type and 
severity of the discipline shall be governed by due process as defined in R477-11-1.(1) 
through R477-ll-l.(l)(e). 
DISCUSSION 
The first issue in dispute is whether or not the Agency can demote Lunnen without first 
implementing corrective action pursuant to R477-10-2. 
In this case there is a history of satisfactory job performance, except in the goal, 
"objective*, of 24-hour call-outs. As to that objective, Lunnen has received notice through 
two annual evaluations and a meeting on April 12, 1992, that he needed improvement in 
that objective. That is, Lunnen needed to show up when he was called out for after-hour 
emergency situations. 
To assist Lunnen "s meeting the objective, the Agency provided him with a pager when 
he could not afford to pay for a phone in his home — a period of eight months. Lunnen *s 
supervisor went to Lunnen's house to pick him up on more than one occasion when there 
was a heavy snowfall that needed emergency clearing and Lunnen had no phone. This 
Hearing Officer believes these pick ups were to assist Lunnen, not to punish or embarrass 
him. 
The unsatisfactory performance of the 24-hour call-out objective did not impede 
Lunnen1 s promotion based upon an overall satisfactory performance. The person who 
recommended that Lunnen be promoted was the same person who had issued him a pager, 
picked him up, gave him time to install a phone, and evaluated Lunnen annually, 
Paul Grassland. 
Can a corrective action plan merely consist of only verbal notice to respond to an 
objective, or an annual evaluation comment which may or may not be clear to the employee, 
or a meeting which informs the employee that there is a problem? In this case, the 
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employee was given notice by each of the above means that there was a problem. The 
solution was to pick him up when he was needed; then a pager was used to contact him; 
then, finally a phone was required to be installed. Each of the above was a means to 
remedy a problem. The problem — not being as responsive as management wanted — was 
communicated in writing at least twice. 
I have discussed the Corrective Action Plan rule because Lunnen made it a key part 
of his defense that he was not given a written Corrective Action Plan as called for in the 
rule. However, the rule regarding corrective actions is not an exclusive remedy when 
"willful misconduct" exists. In this case, demotion resulted due to one incident which 
occurred on June 12,1992. The appropriate rule to apply is R477-11-1, Disciplinary Action. 
(See Grievant Exhibit 2.) This rule applies in cases of".. .insubordination, disloyalty to the 
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, " 
In this case, Lunnen received a phone call from the dispatcher informing him of an 
emergency situation and that he was requested to respond. Lunnen was at home and 
personally received the call. He gave absolutely no indication that he could not or would 
not respond to the call. He was watching a basketball game with a friend. Lunnen»s failure 
to respond is based upon bis claim that he thought it was a prank call. Grievant and his 
wife both testified that they and Grievant • s co-workers call each other during televised 
sporting events and, as a prank, act as if they are calling from work and request that the 
called party report to work. Lunnen believes this is an intervening event that does exculpate 
him. Lunnen did not verify with anyone at work that the call was not legitimate. Lunnen 
cannot validate his failure to respond by putting up a defense that is of his own creation. 
His non-response is not based upon legitimate grounds, but upon a reason that should not 
exist because it has the ability to harm someone or cause someone injury if the result is as 
in this case. 
Is Lunnen subject to discipline for not responding to a direct order? The appropriate 
answer h only if he was insubordinate or disobeyed orders of a superior or was misfeasant 
or malfeasant is he then subject to demotion as a discipline, as stated in R477-11-2, which 
is based upon and recites Utah Code Annotated (UCA), §67-19-18(1). There is no doubt 
Grievant disobeyed the orders of a superior. Disobedience to the orders of a superior is 
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insubordination. The aa is also malfeasance and misfeasance in that Lunnen did not do 
something he should have done and/or did it wrongfully.. No matter how we characterize 
the act, it meets the requirement for discipline. 
The severity of the discipline is governed by R477-ll-l.(l). Discipline must take into 
consideration: consistency of application, prior knowledge of the standards, notice of 
noncompliance, determination of facts and opportunity to respond. Lunnen had prior 
knowledge that there was a problem with his not responding to the call-outs. Grievant 
received notice by way of annual evaluations, verbal notification and by meetings. Lunnen 
has been given the opportunity to respond to the allegation of insubordination. The 
remaining issue is whether or not the demotion is consistent with other employees1 
disciplinary penalties for insubordination. 
The Agency offered one instance of insubordination and a commensurate demotion as 
proof of consistency of application. Taking into account the long and valued work 
performance of Lunnen, it does not appear that a demotion for this act is consistent with 
prior discipline imposed by the Agency. There is no dispute that Lunnen knew about the 
call-out policy of 24-hours and that he knew he was subject to it; but, there is no proof that 
it is a mandatory policy nor that anyone else has been disciplined for not responding to the 
call-out, except the one incident mentioned above. There is substantial evidence from both 
sides that any excuse for not responding was accepted as being valid. In this case, Lunnen 
had no excuse. 
Pursuant to UCA, §67-19a-406, the Agency has the burden of proof in cases of 
demotion. The Agency has not provided any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is 
consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination. It would be difficult and 
probably inequitable to both parties for this Hearing Officer to ratify some random 
discipline. Therefore, Lunnen will continue in his present status for twenty working days 
from receipt of this decision. During this time, the Agency shall submit the best evidence 
they have regarding the discipline they imp< »M<I on others for a similar first insubordination 
finding. If there is no consistency in application of discipline, this Hearing Officer will select 
the most common or equitable discipline. '!. \gency should be aware that if demotion 
is not a consistent discipline, then Lunnen will be reinstated to his prior grade with back 
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pay. 
ORDER 
This Hearing Officer finds that the Agency had the authority to discipline Lunnen an 
that Lunnen was insubordinate by his failure to obey the order of a superior pursuant t 
Lunnen • s prior knowledge that he was subject to a 24-hour call-out. The discipline impose 
shall be held in abeyance pending proof by the Agency that it is consistent with other 
similarly situated employees. The Agency shall submit to this Hearing Officer, through the 
Administrator of the Career Service Review Board, its best proof of what discipline is 
consistently given to employees of the Agency for a first time insubordination, i.e., failure 
to obey the order of a supervisor. This Hearing Officer shall then ratify the Grievant's 
appropriate discipline. If there is no consistent discipline, this Hearing Officer shall select 
the most appropriate one from those disciplines most regularly imposed. Any adjustment 
to Lunnen's grade and pay shall be adjusted when the discipline is imposed. 
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record shall remain open. This 
hearing and its record shall remain open for purposes of appeal by Grievant until the 
discipline is imposed and the time for appeal shall commence subsequent to a modification 
of this Order which imposes the discipline. Copies of all submittals to this Hearing Officer 
shall be provided to GricvanV »a 4 1 UM 
DATED this _£__ day of-Deccmbcr, 1992. 
Michael N. Martinez <Zs~ 
Hearing Officer/Presiding Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
CHARLES D. KENT, 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Agency. 
DECISION ON MOTION 
TO REOPEN HEARING 
Case No. 10 CSRB/H.0.138 
The Department has made a Motion to Reopen the above-entitled hearing dated 
February 20,1992, citing the following two points: 
1. Grievant testified falsely that he kept management informed of his case, when 
in fact he did not; and 
2. Grievant fs testimony that he kept management informed of his case was a 
surprise to the department 
Grievant has responded with an Opposition to the Motion to Reopen, dated March 6, 
1992, by citing the following three points: 
1. The Department's Request to Reopen the hearing is a disguised attempt to 
Request a Re-hearing and the Motion should therefore be denied. 
2. 
3. 
The record has been closed in this matter and the Hearing Officer does not 
have authority to grant the Motion requested by the Department. 
Whether or not Grievant had discussions with Mr. Kimber is only relevant if 
the Hearing Officer determines the Department had formally adopted a policy 
concerning Professional Standards. 
The Department has responded in a Reply, dated March 11, 1992, raising the 
following two points: 
1. The Department does not seek a Re-hearing of this case. 
2. The Hearing Officer has the Authority to re-open the record for the purpose 
of taking additional evidence. 
Rule R140-1-20 E of the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Manual of the Career 
Service Review Board of the State of Utah states: 
Closing of the Record After all testimony, documentary 
evidence, and arguments have been presented, the hearing 
officer shall close the record and terminate the proceeding, 
unless one or both parties agree to submit a posthearing brief 
within a specified time. 
The above-referenced rule sets forth the duty of the hearing officer to close the 
record in the course of conducting a Step 5 hearing for the Career Service Review Board. 
The authority and other duties and matters are also set forth in various sub-sections of 
R140-1-20. In the Motion at hand, the Department is requesting the Hearing Officer to re-
open this hearing to allow an additional witness to testify and be cross-examined. While the 
Hearing Officer is very sensitive to the argument of "complete surprise" made by the 
Department about the testimony of the Grievant given at the hearing, it appears that the 
argument could have been made more appropriately at the hearing itself where "all 
testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments" were supposed to have been made. 
R140-1-20 E. does not make provisions for allowing arguments or evidence to be 
entered after the hearing has been formally closed. Because of the silence of the rule on 
this matter, this Hearing Officer concludes that the drafters of the rule did not contemplate 
that arguments or evidence or additional testimony would be allowed to be entered after 
the hearing had been formally closed. 
The Rule does allow for the record to be kept open if both parties agree to submit 
a posthearing brief, but that is not the case here. 
R140-1-20 M. makes provision for a reconsideration of a Step 5 decision by saying 
that, 'The written request h to contain specific reasons as to why a reconsideration is 
warranted with respect to the factual findings and conclusions of the" decision. This rule 
do^s contemplate the use of a reconsideration procedure and does make specific provisions 
about how it is to occur. 
By making a very strict interpretation of R140-1-20 E. the Hearing Officer concludes 
that it would be an abuse of discretion to re-open a hearing for additional evidence, 
testimony or documents, once it has been formally closed, because no specific provisions are 
DECISION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Departments Motion is hereby respectfully denied. 
DATED this "frl** day of "lj\(xAA^ 1992. 
Sherri R. Guyon * 
CSRB Hearing Officer 
Utah Code Annotated 67-19a-406(2)(a) (1953, as amended). 
(2)(a) The agency has the burden of proof in all 
grievances resulting from dismissals, demotions, suspensions, 
written reprimands, reductions in force, and disputes concerning 
abandonment of position. 
Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20C. 
Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5 
hearing shall be a new hearing for the record, held de novo, with 
both parties being granted full administrative process as 
follows: 
(1) The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual 
findings based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing 
without deference to any prior factual findings of the agency. 
The CSRB hearing officer shall then determine whether: (a) the 
factual findings made from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support 
with substantial evidence the allegations made by the agency or 
the appointing authority, and (b) the agency has correctly 
applied relevant policies, rules and statutes. 
(2) When the CSRB hearing officer determines in 
accordance with the procedures set forth above that the 
evidentiary/step 5 factual findings support the allegations of 
the agency or the appointing authority, then the CSRB hearing 
officer must determine whether the agency's decision, including 
any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive disproportionate 
or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In making this 
latter determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall give 
deference to the decision of the agency or the appointing 
authority unless the agency's penalty is determined to be 
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion 
in which instance the CSRB hearing officer shall determine the 
appropriate remedy. 
Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20E. 
E. Closing of the Record. After all testimony, 
documentary evidence, and arguments have been presented, the 
hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the 
proceeding, unless one or both parties agree to submit a 
posthearing brief within a specified time. 
Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20G. 
G. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. Following the 
closing of the record, the hearing officer shall make and enter a 
written decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. The decision and order is filed with the administrator and 
without further action becomes the decision and order of the 
evidentiary hearing. 
Utah Administrative Code R477-11-1. 
Disciplinary Action. Noncompliance with these rules, 
departmental or other applicable policies and safety policies, 
professional standards adopted by a department, work place 
policies, and such matters as inefficiency, incompetency, failure 
to maintain skills, adequate performance levels, insubordination, 
disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, 
nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of the career service 
shall be cause for disciplinary action. For purposes of R477-11, 
employee shall mean career service employee unless indicated 
otherwise. 
11-1.(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary 
action taken shall be governed by principles of due process which 
include: 
(l)(a) Consistent application 
(l)(b) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(l)(c) Determination of fact 
(l)(d) Timely notice of noncompliance 
(l)(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as 
defined herein. 
11-1.(2) If the agency determines that a career 
service employee is charged with aggravated or repetitive 
misconduct or that the retention of a career service employee 
would endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave 
threat to the public interest, the agency, pending an 
investigation to determine fact upon which disciplinary action 
may be taken, shall utilize one or more of the following options: 
(2)(a) The employee may be placed on paid 
administrative leave (suspension with pay). 
(2)(b) The employee may be temporarily reassigned 
to another position or different work location at the same rate 
of pay pending the completion of the investigation. 
11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under 
Section 67-19-18(4) the disciplinary process includes the 
following: 
(3)(a) The agency representative notifies the 
employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the reasons 
therefor; 
(3)(b) The employee has five working days within 
which to reply and have the reply considered by the agency 
representative before discipline is imposed. 
(3)(c) If an employee waives the right to respond 
or does not reply within the time frames stated in these rules or 
as established by the agency representative, whichever is longer, 
discipline may still be imposed in accordance with these rules. 
(3)(d) The employee and the agency representative 
may agree in writing to waive or extend any grievance step, or 
the time limits specified for any grievance step. 
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the 
reasons for the proposed discipline and has been given an 
opportunity to respond and be responded to, discipline may be 
imposed by the agency representative as appropriate. In 
determining the specific type and severity of the discipline to 
be taken, consideration may be given to such factors as the 
severity of the infraction, the repeated nature of violations, 
prior disciplinary/corrective actions, previous oral warnings, 
written warnings and discussions, the employee's past work 
record, the effect on agency operations, and the potential of the 
violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
Disciplinary action may include one or more of the following 
options: 
(4)(a) Written reprimand. 
(4)(b) Suspension of the employee without pay up 
to 30 calendar days per occurrence requiring discipline. 
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of 
the following methods as provided by law: 
(1) An employee may be moved from a position 
in one class to a position in another class having a lower 
entrance salary if the duties of the position 
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